SUMMARY
Inadvertent administration of non-epidural medications into the epidural space has been associated with serious morbidity 1,2 such as paraplegia or quadriplegia, sensory change and bladder/bowel incontinence. Patients may endure immense pain and suffering, and the health care personnel involved in such incidents may be left with their future career or practice in ruins 3 . In addition, the cost of litigation to the hospital can impact on the delivery of care to other patients. Our aim was to collate the reported mechanisms of such incidents and identify possible strategies for prevention.
METHODS
We performed an Ovid Medline search from 1966 to February 2002 and Embase search from 1988 to February 2002. Search terms were "epidural" and "(inadvertent or accidental)". We did a separate search for "Australian Incident Monitoring Study" (AIMS) and the terms "closed" and "claims". Further reports were identified from reference lists from the papers retrieved.
RESULTS
Thirty-one reports of 37 cases were found using our search strategy . Several papers 4, 5, 12, 18, 19, 25 reported two cases. All but two reports involved epidural injection of a drug intended for intravenous use 2, 32 . Table 1 shows the drug given and the effect on patient outcome. Table 2 outlines the contributing factors, as explicitly reported by the authors or apparent to us on reading the report, that led to the inadvertent administration of non-epidural drugs into the epidural space. For each contributory category, Table 2 also describes possible solutions that might prevent such an incident from occurring in the future.
DISCUSSION
Our literature search of inadvertent epidural injections is likely to represent a gross underestimation of the actual number of incidents that occur. Kasaba and colleagues 33 surveyed 31 anaesthetists in Japan, obtaining a 90% response rate. Ten anaesthetists (36%) had firsthand experience of inadvertent epidural injection of an intravenous drug, while five (18%) had experienced two such incidents. On review of closed claim studies in the United States 34 , Canada 35 and the United Kingdom 36 , the problem of administration of the wrong drug into the epidural space was not specifically identified. Currie and co-workers 37 found 144 incidents in the first 2000 incidents reported to the AIMS in which the wrong drug was nearly or actually given, and included inci-dents of inadvertent injection into the epidural space. "Wrong drug" errors occurred in the operating theatre, pain clinic and on the ward and the drugs were given either as a bolus or as an infusion.
Types of error
The recurrent themes in our identified reports include syringe swap [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 12, 13, 32 , wrong ampoule for drug dilution 1, 17, 18, 22, 23 and performance of loss of resistance 19, 20 technique for epidural insertion. Syringe swaps most commonly involve injection of intravenous induction agents, antibiotics and ephedrine from similar sized syringes, which may or may not be labelled. Potassium chloride is frequently mistaken for normal saline, because the two solutions are presented in similar ampoules with different coloured writing 1, [17] [18] [19] [20] [22] [23] [24] . Gentamicin has also been mistaken for fentanyl, due to both ampoules having red flip tops and being kept in the same locked cupboard 16 . Intravenous epidural line confusion seems to occur most commonly when the epidural giving set has an injection port 14, 24, 27, 30, 31 . Two reports detailed direct connection of the intravenous line to the epidural filter 10, 29 . 45 Increasing drowsiness (4, 6-8) -Methohexital (8) Respiratory difficulty requiring intubation and ventilation (4) No effect detected in patient under general anaesthesia (7) Muscle Relaxant Prolonged neuromuscular blockade Vecuronium bolus (9)
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Benzodiazepine and opioid
Increasing drowsiness, hypoventilation Midazolam and fentanyl infusion (10) Hypotension unresponsive to fluids
Opioid
Generalised coarse non-rhythmic tremor Morphine with 5% dextrose infusion (11) Marked disorientation to time and place
Sympathomimetic
Increase in blood pressure (5, 12) Ephedrine bolus (5, 12*) Tachycardia, severe occipital headache (12)
Antibiotic
No effect detected (13-15) -Cefazolin (13, 14) Back pain 5 hours following the start of infusion (16) Although much less common, human error can also occur in the pharmacy, with a case of an epidural morphine infusion prepared with 5% dextrose rather than normal saline 11 .
Effects of inadvertent epidural injection
As Table 1 demonstrates, inadvertent injection of the wrong drug into the epidural space can have immediate and/or delayed effects. Pain and neurological symptoms immediately following injection are usually due to a direct drug or drug additive neurotoxic, pH or osmolality effect 1, 2, 11, [27] [28] 32 . The rate of application, the total dose 18, 22 and the concentration 4, 6, 7 also play a role. Systemic effects of drugs, such as intravenous induction agents 4,6-8 and vasopressors 5, 12 , occur over time as vascular uptake occurs into the epidural veins. Patients under general anaesthesia [7] [8] [9] or infants 13 are unable to complain. There is also usually a delay in onset of symptoms with drug infusion, because of slow vascular uptake over time 11, 16, [24] [25] [26] [27] 31 .
Management of inadvertent epidural injection
Once the error has occurred, there is no definitive or effective treatment. Some practitioners choose to just observe the patient and provide symptomatic and supportive treatment as required 1, 19 , while others attempt to reduce the amount or concentration of the drug in the epidural space. Measures taken include aspiration of the epidural catheter 7, 32 , flushing with distilled water 28 or saline 4, 5, [7] [8] [9] 14, 24, 26, 31, 32 and insertion of a second epidural catheter for lavage of the epidural space 6 . Epidural local anaesthetic has been used for symptomatic treatment 4, 6, 12, 13, 28, 29 , epidural or intravenous corticosteroids 6, 8, 12, 17, 20, 22, 23, 26, 32 to reduce the inflammatory response and epidural hyaluronidase 8 to aid the dispersion of the solution and reduce local concentration. None of these attempts to minimize the risk of an adverse outcome are of proven benefit and some can potentially worsen the situation, resulting in upward spread of drug and further symptoms 24 . Local anaesthetic can also confuse the diagnosis of neurological injury. Resuscitative measures include intubation to support the airway 1, 4, 18, 22 and the administration of antihypertensive drugs 12, 17, 22, 25 . Symptomatic relief includes diazepam 1, 18, 23, 25 , midazolam 20 or opioids 18 for muscle spasm, and reversal of systemic effects with antagonists, for example flumazenil and naloxone 24 . Medication error is the single most preventable cause of patient injury 39 . This includes wrong patient, wrong time and wrong drug, dose or route of administration. Given the fact that there is no effective treatment, and the potential for short and long term morbidity, prevention should be the main defence strategy.
PREVENTIVE STRATEGIES
Human error is a pervasive part of everyday life 40 and various strategies have been suggested to prevent the occurrence of such errors in relation to inadvertent epidural injection. 
Drug preparation
It has been recommended that drugs should be drawn up separately, after reading the ampoule, with the syringe or bag labelled. This is especially important when there is no one person directly responsible for drug administration (for example when two anaesthetists are attending the same patient). Only drugs that are required should be drawn up or kept in the vicinity, to avoid errors such as potassium chloride being mistaken for normal saline 1, [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] . Others suggest that emergency drugs such as ephedrine should be kept physically separate or covered with tape to avoid accidental administration 5, 12 . A separate tray has been recommended for regional drugs, to avoid confusion with intravenous agents [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 12, 13, 32 . Any doubtful drugs or syringes should be discarded.
Epidural drug administration strategies
It has been standard nursing practice for many years to double check with another person prior to administering any drug, but this may not be practical for the theatre anaesthetist and alternative measures are required. A computer system using barcode readers has also been used in an attempt to reduce parenteral drug administration error 41 . Slow incremental injection while maintaining verbal contact may allow earlier detection of problems.
Labelling
Packaging and labelling of ampoules with appropriate size writing and colour for easy reading helps to avoid the problem of drawing up solution from the wrong ampoule. Colour coding by the manufacturer or the hospital pharmacy for the class of drug can act as a visual cue 37 . The addition of colouring to potassium chloride 18 or the incorporation of a black cap 42 has been suggested to avoid confusion with normal saline. However more errors occur due to "syringe swap" than "wrong ampoule" 37 . Labelling of syringes does help to reduce this problem but does not totally alleviate it. Currie and co-workers found 63% of drug incidents associated with syringes occurred with correctly labelled syringes 37 . We found five such cases in our study 5, 7, 12, 13 . Syringes with red plungers are now widely available for muscle relaxants and there are proponents for different coloured syringes for regional drugs as an additional visual cue 37 . Clear labelling of epidural infusion bags, syringes, pumps, infusion sets, ports for injection and epidural catheters may improve safety. However there have been many cases where intravenous infusions have been inadvertently attached to epidural lines with access ports available 10, 14, 24, 27, [29] [30] [31] .
Epidural lines and Injection ports
Epidural lines with injection ports should preferably be avoided altogether, because labels can accidentally fall off with exposure of the access port 30 . Coloured stripes bonded to the tubing wall can also be used as a visual cue for epidural lines.
Physical separation of intravenous and epidural access points
Epidural and intravenous catheters should be placed physically separate from one another, to reduce the risk of confusion between the two systems 24 . However, lack of education, knowledge or inattention have led to intravenous lines being directly attached to epidural filters 10, 29 .
System Change
Most wrong drug incidents involve latent errors, or errors waiting to happen. Systems can be designed to minimize contributing and precipitating factors, and to help detect and absorb the effects of such error 40 . Fatigue, haste, distraction and inattention can degrade the ability of the anaesthetist to monitor a highly routine action that is done automatically with dissociation from the conscious control. This type of error occurs where a close, but not perfect, cue is accepted and acted upon 37 . This can lead to the use of a wrong ampoule or wrong syringe or confusion between intravenous and epidural lines.
Despite all the precautions mentioned, incidents continue to occur. Table 2 describes some possible strategies that had the potential to prevent 97% of the reported incidents. Several workers have proposed the development of a system for regional equipment that is incompatible with the intravenous Luer system [43] [44] [45] [46] . The implementation of such change would not only make inadvertent epidural administration less likely, but could also prevent intrathecal injections of intravenous drugs and inadvertent intravenous injection of epidural drugs. Such incidents have received increased attention recently 43, 47, 48 . There have been at least 13 cases of inadvertent intrathecal administration of vincristine in Britain since 1985, ten of which have been fatal and three of which have resulted in permanent paralysis 47 . Similarly, there are several reported incidents of inadvertent administration of epidural drugs intravenously [48] [49] [50] , two of which have proven fatal 48, 50 . Changing the calibre of the connectors on all regional equipment would make them incompatible with the intravenous system 38, [43] [44] [45] [46] . In addition to this change, access to drugs used for regional anaesthesia needs to be addressed. For example, ampoules containing epidural or intrathecal 47 AVOIDING INADVERTENT EPIDURAL DRUG ADMINISTRATION drugs could be made inaccessible to intravenous equipment, their Luer connections or needles. Although such system-wide change could make this type of incident almost a thing of the past, the numerous challenges presented would require professional, financial and political support 38 .
